Russia and Ukraine 3 years on: what next?

President Trump has rocked Europe by starting talks with Moscow. What next for Russia and Ukraine 3 years after Russia’s invasion?

In mid-February, with the 3rd anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine looming, the US administration launched a chaotic negotiation process with Moscow. Let’s look at who said what; and what might happen next.

If you want to go straight to “what might happen next” scroll down. For historical background on the conflict, see my 2022 Ukraine/Russia war explainer.

The peaceful Shakhtar stadium in Donetsk, Eastern Ukraine, during Euro 2012 – two years before Russia’s 2014 invasion

Defense Secretary Hegseth kicks up a storm

On Wednesday 12 February, US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth addressed the European Security Conference in Munich. Key quotes (my emphasis):

– ‘we will only end this devastating war and establish a durable peace… with a realistic assessment of the battlefield… we must start by recognizing that returning to Ukraine’s pre-2014 borders is an unrealistic objective. Chasing this illusionary goal will only prolong the war and cause more suffering.’

– ‘the United States does not believe that NATO membership for Ukraine is a realistic outcome of a negotiated settlement.‘

– ‘as part of any security guarantee, there will not be US troops deployed to Ukraine.’

– ‘stark strategic realities prevent the United States of America from being primarily focused on the security of Europe… the US is prioritising deterring war with China in the Pacific… as the United States prioritizes its attention to these threats, European allies must lead from the front. Together, we can establish a division of labor that maximizes our comparative advantages in Europe and Pacific respectively.’

It’s worth reading Hegseth’s brief remarks in full. In addition to the much-reported bits above, he also reaffirmed US commitment to NATO (a good thing) and applauded Sweden and Poland for their military spending and support to Ukraine.

Former Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt commented: ‘It’s certainly an innovative approach to a negotiation to make very major concessions even before they have started.’ He compared Hegseth’s statement to British Prime Minister Chamberlain’s appeasement of Hitler in 1938, allowing Germany to occupy the Sudetenland. Bildt noted that had not turned out well. Hegseth then stoked the confusion by saying on 13 February that ‘everything is still on the table‘.

Russia and Ukraine 3 years on: Trump speaks to Putin

Also on 12 February, President Trump said he had had a ‘lengthy and highly productive’ call with Russia’s President Putin and had ‘agreed to have our respective teams start negotiations immediately.’ It was the first time a US president had spoken to Putin since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Reporting the call, Trump made no mention of Ukraine – or any other country apart from the US and Russia – taking part in the talks. Speaking to reporters, he said it was unlikely Ukraine would return to its pre-2014 borders but said that ‘some of that land will come back.’ He also said he agreed with Hegseth that Ukraine would not join NATO.

Lenin’s Mausoleum in Moscow, 2005. I discuss why President Putin wants to keep Lenin’s mummified body on display in Red Square in my book “Lessons in Diplomacy”

European leaders respond

Hegseth’s comments; the news that Trump had spoken to Putin; and the fact that neither mentioned a role for Ukraine, or Europe, poleaxed European leaders.

In response, France, the UK, Germany, Poland, Italy, Spain, Ukraine and the European Commission said on 12 February that ‘our shared objectives should be to put Ukraine in a position of strength. Ukraine and Europe must be part of any negotiations.’ But Trump’s special envoy for Ukraine and Russia, retired general Keith Kellogg, told the Munich conference he did not expect Europe to have a seat at the negotiating table. Moscow gleefully said the same.

European leaders held a summit on 17 February to discuss a route forward. The UK has promised unprecedented levels of support to Ukraine in 2025, and Prime Minister Starmer said British troops could be stationed in Ukraine if a settlement was reached. Sweden followed suit. Polish PM Donald Tusk said: ‘If we, Europeans, fail to spend big on defence now, we will be forced to spend 10 times more if we don’t prevent a wider war.‘ But initial signs are that the summit did not produce concrete results.

Vice President Vance attacks Europe

Further confusion came as US Vice President Vance spoke in Munich on 15 February. Instead of talking about Ukraine and Russia, he scolded European governments, including the UK, for supposedly limiting democracy and free speech. He raised a number of detailed examples, mostly of the type that would most incense Trump supporters in the US (probably the main audience for the speech). EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas accused Vance of “trying to pick a fight” with Europe. The leader of Germany’s far-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) said Vance’s speech was “excellent”.

To put the icing on the confusion, President Trump said that US, Russian and Ukrainian officials would meet at the Munich conference (they didn’t).

Why is the US doing this?

Isolationism has been a strong sentiment in US foreign policy for over a century – arguably as far back as 1796. The US did not enter World War 1 until 1917; and stayed out of World War 2 until the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour in 1941. Tension persists between US instincts to keep out of foreign entanglements; and the urge to take an active international role. The trouble is, turning their back on international events has not worked well for the US in the past. A bad peace deal in Ukraine may lead to more violence from Russia and others, which in turn causes the US more trouble than remaining engaged now.

Ukrainians like to point out that Kyiv was a sophisticated city for centuries before Moscow existed

President Zelensky’s response triggers a row

President Zelensky of Ukraine at first responded diplomatically to the avalanche of confusion. He said Ukraine ‘will not be able to accept any agreements‘ made without its involvement. He said he would meet Putin only once Ukraine had agreed a peace plan with the US. After meeting US officials, Zelensky also said he had been assured that the US would continue to help Ukraine. He mostly bent over backwards to avoid openly criticising Trump’s initiatives.

After Trump continued to parrot Russian propaganda into a second week, including, incredibly, claiming that Ukraine started the war, however, something snapped. Zelensky said on 19 February that: “President Trump… unfortunately lives in this disinformation space… around Trump there is a disinformation bubble.” This struck me as 100% fair. But when you’re dealing with thin-skinned narcissists, it’s risky to rub their noses in it. Trump responded with an ugly torrent of hysterical insults and threats against Zelensky, calling him “a dictator”, warning that he had “better move fast” or “he won’t have a country left”. This is straight-out nonsense, like most of what President Putin says about the reasons he attacked Ukraine in the first place. But it underlines the challenges of building effective communications with Trump’s White House – see “What should Europe do?” below.

Interestingly, on 21 February, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said that there would be no Putin-Trump meeting “until we know what the meeting will be about”. This struck me as the first time anyone on the US side had exhibited any trace of spine in their dealings with Russia since Hegseth’s remarks. Let’s see whether this slightly tougher US line will continue, or whether the White House will continue with Hegseth’s and Trump’s initial policy of abject surrender.

Russia and Ukraine 3 years on: what happens next?

The transatlantic relationship is in uncharted waters. It is not yet necessarily holed below the waterline. But major challenges lie ahead. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen is right to talk about an “emergency mindset” being required.

The US has thrown down the gauntlet to Europe, including the UK, to raise their game and defend Ukraine themselves. If this doesn’t happen, Trump threatens to deal with Russia without even consulting Europe – or Ukraine. The bizarre opening concessions to Moscow by the US, on NATO membership for Ukraine and territory, have lit a fire under Europe.

A key variable will be to what extent the US continues to support Ukraine, as Zelensky suggested, while talks continue. A high-profile US weapons transfer to Ukraine now might do much to calm nerves in Kyiv – and pressure Moscow to make its own concessions. We should not forget that Russia is on the ropes economically and militarily. They desperately want a ceasefire to rebuild their armed forces.

What should Europe do?

Europe must do three difficult things:

(i) European nations must increase their defence spending to be ready to resist Russian aggression with no or minimal U.S. support. Former British Prime Minister John Major has said a “very major increase” is needed. The cost of deterrence is vastly less than the cost of an actual war – or defending against an emboldened aggressor. When Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson visited Vienna in 2016, I argued over a late night beer that the only way to stop further Russian aggression after their 2014 invasion was to arm Ukraine to the teeth. The only language Moscow understood was military might. Unfortunately other counsels prevailed, leading to Russia’s renewed invasion in 2022;

A 2011 military exercise in Ukraine

(ii) equally difficult, European governments must explain to their electorates – who are struggling with the cost of living, energy costs and health costs – why increased defence spending is necessary to their security. In theory, Europe can easily out-spend Russia. But to do so, it needs to carry voters with it. Russia and its allies – eg the AfD in Germany – will vigorously argue the opposite case;

(iii) European governments must also (re-)build load-bearing relationships with Washington. This, too, will be challenging. US leaders often over-estimate their ability to solve problems on their own. Thus, as I say in my book Lessons in Diplomacy, “consultation and building alliances [are] not always as automatic an instinct to them as might [be] ideal.” This will be a tough test for PM Starmer – who is going to Washington next week, hoping to act as “bridge” between the US and Europe – and the UK’s newly-appointed ambassador to Washington, Peter Mandelson. 

Russia and Ukraine 3 years on: what might a peace deal look like?

Building any kind of substantive deal will be complex. Up to now, all peace proposals have foundered on identifying a landing zone that would satisfy both Kyiv and Moscow. Ukraine wants no sacrifice of land to reward a barbaric invader. Anything that doesn’t look like victory will cost Putin his future – for sacrificing hundreds of thousands of young Russians in a pointless invasion. Questions include:

Who will make the deal?

It may seem simpler to President Trump to deal with just one interlocutor. It’s like building a house: if you don’t bother with the complication of foundations, it’s much quicker. But precedents (see “Trump’s deals” below) suggest that excluding Ukraine or Europe, quite apart from its obvious injustice, would condemn any agreement to failure.

The perils of precedent

A deal allowing Russia to keep any part of Ukraine through an imperialist invasion would launch a hundred new wars. Russia, emboldened, would attack Ukraine again – as it did after the flawed peace settlement following Russia’s 2014 invasion. It might decide to attack another neighbour – e.g. Kazakhstan, Moldova or the Baltic states. Every country around the world with expansionist designs, from China to Venezuela, would think “if the US lets Russia get away with this, why not us?”

Could the status of occupied territory be left open?

After the Soviet Union occupied the Baltic States in 1940, most western countries did not recognise the illegal annexation for over 50 years, until the three countries became independent again in 1991. Similar non-recognition might be one option for any parts of Ukraine, such as Crimea, that Ukraine could have to give up – at least temporarily – to secure a peace deal.

The only language Putin understands?

What about security guarantees?

How would any security guarantees to stop Russia attacking again be structured? Where would peacekeeping troops come from? What would their mandate be? Who would pay for them? Would the US be involved? PM Keir Starmer said a “US backstop” was essential to stop Russia invading again. Ukraine’s President Zelensky said ‘security guarantees without America are not real security guarantees’. Russia’s record of trashing international agreements, from the Budapest Memorandum of 1994 to the Treaty on Friendship, Co-operation and Partnership it signed with Ukraine in 1997, recognising Ukraine’s borders and promising never to invade, underlines the importance of cast-iron security guarantees to underpin any peace deal.

Nor is it clear that Russia – which has used “fear of NATO expansion” as one of its excuses to attack Ukraine – would want foreign soldiers from NATO countries keeping the peace there. Following US-Russia talks in Riyadh on 18 February, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov said Moscow would “not accept” peacekeeping forces from NATO countries in Ukraine. Just because Russia doesn’t want it doesn’t mean it can’t happen. But to assemble and maintain a capable force of tens or even hundreds of thousands of foreign troops to be stationed in Ukraine for years to prevent a future Russian invasion would be a colossal task.

Russia and Ukraine 3 years on: Trump’s deals

President Zelensky of Ukraine has observed drily that he’s seen no sign of what Trump’s peace plan, if any, might be.

But isn’t Trump a brilliant negotiator? That’s what he and his team keep saying.

In fact, Trump’s record in solving international crises is, er, patchy. Three examples:

• In 2018, Trump pledged to stop North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme. He made big concessions to North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, including a summit meeting. Then, as now, he freelanced without trying to involve partners. A New York Times headline from 2018 reads: “Trump’s promises to Kim Jong-un leave US and allies scrambling”. Result: 100% failure. Seven years later, North Korea continues to develop its nuclear weapons programme – now with Russian help;
• In early 2020, the US signed the Doha Accord with the Taliban to bring “peace” to Afghanistan. Trump did not involve the Afghan government in the talks. 18 months later, the Taliban occupied Kabul, erasing all semblance of a modern or democratic state. They also turned the lives of many women and girls into a nightmare. For the inside story of the withdrawal from Afghanistan, I recommend Laurie Bristow’s Kabul: Final Call.
• On 5 February 2025, at a press conference with Israeli PM Netanyahu, Trump said: “The US will take over the Gaza Strip and we will do a job with it too.” He added: “We will own it and be responsible for dismantling all of the dangerous unexploded bombs and other weapons on the site”, and “This could be the Riviera of the Middle East”. He has since said that the entire two-million-strong population of Gaza should be permanently resettled elsewhere. The plan has met with widespread incredulity and opposition.

Do Trump’s plans for “solving” Russia’s war on Ukraine have firmer foundations than his plans for Korea, Afghanistan and Gaza? Let’s see. Judging from some of his comments after the US-Russia talks in Riyadh on 18 February, the US president’s grasp on the facts of the war is non-existent. His comment that Ukraine ‘should have never started it‘ and that ‘a half-baked negotiator could have settled this years ago’ beggar belief. So does the way Trump consistently parrots Moscow’s talking points, for example about the supposed need for new elections in Ukraine. None of this augurs well for the prospects of a fair, lasting peace.

Ukraine’s Strategic Missile Forces Museum. In 1994 Kyiv gave up around 1,700 nuclear warheads. In return, Russia promised never to attack Ukraine

Russia’s response

The US has proposed Ukraine giving up NATO membership and sacrificing land illegally occupied by Russia. But the US has not said anything about what Russia might give up as part of any settlement. It may be that a brilliant plan exists in Washington, D.C. to ensure Russia makes equally huge concessions. So far, as Zelensky says, we have seen no sign of this.

Unsurprisingly, therefore, reactions in Russia to the comments by Hegseth, Vance and Trump have been euphoric. Russia has from the outset been waiting for NATO and western unity in support of Ukraine to crack. Now, that seems to be happening. A pro-Kremlin TV commentator said that his wildest dreams had been surpassed by the US initiative.

Russia and Ukraine 3 years on: prospects

Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Few people then thought the war would be continuing three years later. Ukraine has defended itself with extraordinary courage. Yet the cost has been immense, both in casualties and resources. Most Ukrainians would dearly love to stop the war. But many are viscerally opposed to any peace deal that rewards Russia for its aggression.

At the time of writing, a deal that is acceptable to both sides is hard to envisage. Much depends on whether the US leadership – including Trump himself – devotes all its resources to securing a deal. That should include putting pressure on Russia, too, to make concessions. If, however, the President’s attention is distracted by other pressing problems, talk of solving the conflict may wither – and the grinding war of attrition we have seen over the past three years continue into a fourth.

For more background, Chapter 5 of my new book “Lessons in Diplomacy: Politics, Power and Parties” is called “How to understand Putin’s war on Ukraine”.