The Chagos Islands are a problem left over by history. The UK’s plan to transfer sovereignty to Mauritius is a big step forward. But challenges remain. What’s going on? A former Director of Overseas Territories writes.
Going overboard
‘Ready to go overboard?’ the marine says.
‘Ready.’ I eye the choppy water, studded with coral reefs, and swallow.
I slip off the RIB – a substantial motor boat – and into the water, alongside several marines half my age: big, beefy blokes with names like “Snips”, “Whisky” and “Ginger”. We swim towards land, scrambling over razor-sharp reefs that prevent boats reaching the island. At last we wade ashore on the – currently – uninhabited Île Boddam, the largest island of the Salomon atoll in the far north of the British Indian Ocean Territory.
After swimming ashore on Île Boddam
Chagos Islands: a new dawn?
Two years ago, in November 2022, the British government announced that it would open negotiations with Mauritius about sovereignty over BIOT, the British Indian Ocean Territory or Chagos Islands. This would include “the status of the former inhabitants of the Chagos Archipelago.” No-one took much notice.
Then, on 3 October 2024, the United Kingdom and Mauritius, in a joint statement, announced “an historic political agreement on the exercise of sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago“. Commentators responded with astonishment.
The key paragraph of the 3 October 2024 announcement reads:
“Today’s political agreement is subject to the finalisation of a treaty and supporting legal instruments, which both sides have committed to complete as quickly as possible. Under the terms of this treaty the United Kingdom will agree that Mauritius is sovereign over the Chagos Archipelago, including Diego Garcia. At the same time, both our countries are committed to the need, and will agree in the treaty, to ensure the long-term, secure and effective operation of the existing base on Diego Garcia which plays a vital role in regional and global security. For an initial period of 99 years, the United Kingdom will be authorised to exercise with respect to Diego Garcia the sovereign rights and authorities of Mauritius required to ensure the continued operation of the base well into the next century.”
Chagos Islands announcement: what does it mean?
The announcement of 3 October 2024 of the transfer of sovereignty over the Chagos Islands is, indeed, momentous stuff. The French first settled the (unpopulated) islands in the 18th century as part of Mauritius. The UK took over in 1814. Under both, slaves and indentured labours were shipped to the islands to build up a coconut oil industry. Some stayed for generations; others rotated in and out as indentured labour, particularly in the 1960s.
During the 1960s, when Mauritius (including the Chagos Islands) were still a British colony, the UK and US began talks to establish a US military base on Diego Garcia. In 1965 – three years before Mauritius became independent – the UK separated off the Chagos Islands as “The British Indian Ocean Territory”. It is this separation that the UK and Mauritius have now announced their intention to reverse.
The Chagossians
Before the US built their base on the island of Diego Garcia in the far south of the Chagos islands in the early 1970s, the UK removed the entire population then living in the islands to Mauritius and the Seychelles. The UK paid compensation, intended for the people affected. But legal cases over subsequent decades, including emotive testimony from Chagossians, argued for their return. They also argued that the compensation paid was inadequate – leading to the UK paying more. Philippe Sands, a lawyer who has championed the cause of the Chagossians, wrote about the case in his book The Last Colony.
A pretty decent Wikipedia summary of the history of BIOT, including its separation from the then-colony of Mauritius in 1965, is here. The expulsion is the subject of a separate Wikipedia piece here. Both reproduce a notorious and much-quoted minute dated 24 August 1966 by one PRH Wright, with an annotation by DA Greenhill, which makes derogatory remarks about the inhabitants of the islands as “Tarzans and Men Fridays” and a joke about “Birds” too ghastly to summarise. The colonial-era tone of this communication has not helped the British government case over the years.
A visit to the Chagos Islands
I visited the British Indian Ocean Territory in 2006. At the time, I was in charge of the Overseas Territories in the Foreign Office (FCO). This made me commissioner, or non-resident governor, of BIOT. I had read of the islands in Simon Winchester’s 1985 book Outposts. Like many people, I was sympathetic to the plight of the Chagossians. Earlier in 2006, the FCO had arranged for a group of Chagossians to visit the islands. It was the first time since the 1970s they had been able to return. Opinions differed over whether, if the Chagossians won the case to resettle the outer islands, this would be feasible. I wanted to see for myself, and form an opinion.
A memorial on Peros Banhos to the 2006 visit by Chagossians – Photo LT
Could the Chagos islands be resettled?
Leaving aside the legal arguments, my visit left me scratching my head about the practicality of re-establishing any kind of functioning settlement on the outer islands – as opposed, to, say, a holiday resort – without massive subsidies. The islands are minuscule – the entire land area of the Peros Bahnos atoll, one of the likeliest spots for a resettlement, is less than ten square kilometres. The land area of the Salomon atoll is far smaller. They are, like most atolls, low-lying and vulnerable. There is no infrastructure except on Diego Garcia itself, which under present plans will not be open for resettlement. None of this means that the Chagossians have not been appallingly treated in the past; or that they do not have a powerful legal and moral case for returning. But resettlement will not be straightforward.
Set against this, the joint statement says: “Mauritius will now be free to implement a programme of resettlement on the islands of the Chagos Archipelago, other than Diego Garcia, and the UK will capitalise a new trust fund, as well as separately provide other support, for the benefit of Chagossians”. Let’s see.
An abandoned church on Île du Coin, Peros Banhos atoll – Photo LT
Chagos Islands: current debate
In 2016, the British government apologised for “The manner in which the Chagossian community was removed from the Territory in the 1960s and 1970s, and the way they were treated.” In 2017, the UN General Assembly referred the territorial dispute between the UK and Mauritius over the Chagos Islands to the International Court of Justice. In 2019, the ICJ ruled that the UK’s separation of the islands from Mauritius in 1965 had not been lawful, and that the UK must transfer them back to Mauritius. Against this background, the UK’s 2022 announcement that it would open negotiations with Mauritius about the Chagos Islands looked eminently sensible.
I was therefore surprised that the announcement of 3 October of the transfer of sovereignty caused so much controversy in the UK. In particular, several candidates for the leadership of the Conservative Party – due to be decided on 2 November – criticised the decision. They and other critics argued that the decision would cost the UK money; would undermine the position of the US base on Diego Garcia; or was otherwise against UK interests.
Will the transfer of sovereignty cost the UK money?
BIOT under the present set-up costs the UK taxpayer money without generating any income. This is true of most Overseas Territories. The US does not pay “rent” for use of the military base on Diego Garcia. The financial impact of the new agreement will depend on how much the UK proposes to pay for “exercising with respect to Diego Garcia the sovereign rights and authorities of Mauritius“. It will also depend whether the US will contribute some or all of any such costs.
A risk to the US military?
Perhaps conscious that past UK governments had argued that UK sovereignty over BIOT was key to the operation of the base on Diego Garcia, the British government on 3 October 2024 released an additional statement. It argues that the deal will strengthen, rather than weaken, the legal basis of the US-run base. “For the first time in more than 50 years,” it says, “the status of the base will be undisputed and legally secure, following a political agreement between the UK and Mauritius.” This sounds plausible, pending sight of the “treaty and supporting legal instruments” described in the joint statement.
The impact on the military value of the US Diego Garcia base, too, will depend on the details of the agreement. Does it place any restrictions on military use of the “outer islands” of BIOT? These include the Egmont Islands (depopulated in the 1930s); the Peros Banhos atoll; and the Salomon atoll. The latter were both depopulated as part of the removals of the 1970s. They are the likeliest spots for any resettlement. Geography is important. BIOT is a group of atolls about 230 km from north to south and a bit over half as wide. Diego Garcia is around 2,150 km from Mauritius. Peros Banhos and the Salomons are around 230 km away from Diego Garcia, Egmont Island around 140 km.
It is open to debate whether civilian resettlement of the outer islands would affect the military value of Diego Garcia. Military use of the outer islands by a hostile power would be another matter. But it seems unlikely that the agreement would allow this. The US, which will have been consulted at every step of the negotiations, has welcomed the deal. So has India.
Should the Chagossians have been consulted?
Reactions from Chagossians to the 3 October announcement have been mixed. The Guardian reported Olivier Bancoult, chair of the Chagos Refugee Group, as welcoming it. But he added that “if Mauritius will not fulfil its respnsibilities to us, of course we will raise our voices.” Others complained no-one had consulted them. We can expect continued criticism of the October 2024 announcement from those who feel it disadvantages them.
An abandoned cemetery on Peros Banhos – Photo LT
A future source of conflict?
Bancoult’s challenge over whether Chagossians will actually be able to resettle the islands highlights a potential future source of conflict. Will the Chagossians want to resettle the outer islands under the terms of the agreement? Will the Mauritians, once they regain sovereignty, allow or encourage this? Bancoult’s comments also highlight the advantages of the deal to London. People will always accuse the UK of historic colonial misdeeds. But in future, the resettlement of the outer Chagos islands will be for the government of Mauritius to decide.
Similarly, I was struck by a statement to the British parliament by Foreign Secretary David Lammy, reported in the Guardian of 7 October. Asked about the fate of more than 60 Tamil refugees stranded on the island of Diego Garcia for years, Lammy said: “On signing the treaty this is now a matter for Mauritius.”
Does the deal have implications for other Overseas Territories?
In short, no. The circumstances of each British Overseas Territory are unique. Some, such as Gibraltar and the Falklands, are subject to territorial disputes. People living in both are passionate about remaining under the wing of the UK. Others, such as Pitcairn, are too small to be independent. Still others, like the Cayman Islands and Bermuda, could be independent tomorrow if they wanted to, but prefer the status quo. Arguments will rumble on. But there is little crossover between the issues affecting the individual OTs.
The Chagos Islands: in summary
I personally think the new announcement is terrific news. My new book “Lessons in Diplomacy: Politics, Power and Parties“, has a chapter about Britain’s Overseas Territories, including the Falklands, St Helena and the Caribbean territories, entitled “How to grapple with a legacy of colonialism”. I note optimistically the opening of negotiations on the Chagos Islands in 2022. But I also point out that the OTs are famous for generating complex problems. ‘In few places,’ I write, ‘is the contrast between “easy-looking path to solution” and “ghastly morass of quicksand” so stark as in the British Overseas Territories.” The Chagos Islands deal announced on 3 October solves a lot of problems. It will, no doubt also create new ones. Let us hope they are lesser ones.
Conservative criticism
Criticism of the deal by Conservative politicians is synthetic. All are desperate to appeal to party members who will vote in a new leader in a few weeks. Conservative Party members are, indeed, conservative. But the politicians know perfectly well it was a Conservative government that started the process of transferring sovereignty in 2022. The debate highlights how UK foreign policy has become increasingly polarised since Brexit.
What next?
Any issue as loaded with historical burdens as this will inevitably leave many people unhappy or enraged. For the first time in centuries, it will no longer be true that “the sun never sets on the British empire”. But on balance, this deal is a clear step forward. I shall watch with interest to see whether Île du Coin and Île Boddam are resettled by Chagossians any time soon.
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